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(Orcid:0000-0002-9695-6685)The majority of megaprojects fail to achieve their objectives. Studies suggest that up to two-thirds of them do not
meet time, cost or performance targets, a much higher proportion than that for conventional projects. Failures are
attributed to various causes: stakeholder biases, lack of investment in front-end planning and optimistic estimates
and/or schedules, among other factors. Further, it is evident that owners increasingly require larger, more complex
projects within compressed timescales. However, even if experience shows that the objectives are unrealistic,
there is almost invariably a contractor that is willing to provide a competitive tender for the work. Despite
recent improvements in management capability and enhancements to procurement and contracting practices, risk
assessment, project planning and control, there has been little noticeable improvement in the outcomes of most
megaprojects. This paper, based on both authors’ academic and industrial experiences of megaprojects, focuses on
another factor, the contract, and provides an alternative view of the contractual context in which megaprojects are
to be delivered and how this affects the current practice of scaling up contracts and procedures in an attempt to
offer megaprojects levels of certainty similar to those of traditional projects. Indeed, the existing contracting practice
may act to militate against the adoption of more appropriate delivery approaches.1. Introduction
This paper takes a view of megaproject delivery and performance
over the years and considers this through the lens of the role of
the contract. While supported by research papers, guides and case
studies, the paper reﬂects the combined industrial and academic
experience of the authors.
An overview of megaprojects is ﬁrst presented and then the
complex nature of these projects investigated. Attention is then
given to the role of contracts in megaprojects and the current best
practice. The concept of ‘incomplete contracts’ is introduced, and
a critical discussion of the beneﬁts and constraints of contracts
is presented. The paper ﬁnally considers whether the role of
contracts is something that should be investigated further in
attempting to improve the delivery of megaprojects. This paper
reviews the performance of megaprojects, concentrating on the
role of contracts based on years of experience of research and
consultancy work in this sector.
2. Background to megaprojects
There are many deﬁnitions of megaprojects, many using slightly
different terms, such as ‘major projects’, ‘giant projects’, ‘jumbo
projects’ or ‘large engineering projects’ (Lee et al., 2009; Miller
and Lessard, 2001; Mousavi et al., 2011), but this paper uses the
term ‘megaprojects’. In a recent literature review, Sainati (2017)
considered ten deﬁning features for characterising megaprojects:
economic size, physical tangible outcome, impact on the context,
government involvement and political relevance, organisational
complexity and heterogeneity, long-time commitment, vast
uncertainty and risk, challenging investment, megaprojects asprogrammes and poor track record of performance. Sykes (1998)
identiﬁed eight attributes of megaprojects: large size and multiple
owners; public opposition to the expected social, economic,
political and environmental impacts; development time; location;
potential to destabilise markets; unique risks; ﬁnancing difﬁculties;
and an unpopular career course for senior managers. Galloway
and Reilly (2013) presented eight facts about megaprojects:
cost above US$1 billion; multiple-year execution schedules;
multinational involvement of designers, engineers, contractors,
equipment suppliers and specialty material vendors; specialty trade
workforces numbering in thousands of individuals; consortium
ﬁnancing and/or ownership; technical complexity; political
ramiﬁcations and risks; and social ramiﬁcations and risks.
In this paper, any project demonstrating the majority of the attributes
outlined by Sainati (2017), Sykes (1998) and Galloway and Reilly
(2013) mentioned earlier is considered to be a megaproject.
The bulk of the recently published research papers regarding
improvement of the performance of megaprojects rarely, if ever,
mention the role played by the contracts between the major parties
involved in the project or the contractual frameworks of the projects.
Studies of teams, behaviour and conﬂict have been undertaken,
such as that by Fellows and Liu (2010), but do not consider the
contractual and legal contexts for managing the relationship between
the owner and contractor. On occasion, papers identify the delivery
mechanism or payment mechanism(s), but these are not the same as
the contractual terms and conditions or the legal framework within
which the project is executed. This is a signiﬁcant lacuna in the
literature on the management of megaprojects.E under the CC-BY license 
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against changing long-standing approaches because the highly
speciﬁed relationships between the parties set out in contracts to
execute projects do not allow room for innovation and frequently
do not encourage it because there is always the risk that a new
approach will not comply with the detailed provisions of the
contract. This is compounded because it appears that owners and
their legal advisors are increasingly risk averse.
3. Megaprojects and complexity
While the recognition of complexity in projects is a relatively recent
development, the underlying issues and alternative approaches to
managing them or modelling them have been identiﬁed in previous
decades but not fully considered in the development of new contract
forms. For instance, the goals-and-methods matrix developed by
Turner and Cochrane (1993), reproduced here as Figure 1, identiﬁes
the interaction between deﬁnition of goals and the application of
methods to achieve them. It is noteworthy that Turner and Cochrane
(1993) suggested that engineering and construction projects are type
1 projects with well-deﬁned goals and methods, although in reality
there were always engineering and construction projects for which
this was not true, particularly megaprojects.
The Cyneﬁn framework was developed by Snowden (2002) and
Snowden and Kurtz (2003). The domains were originally called
‘simple’, ‘complicated’, ‘complex’ and ‘chaotic’ and with a centre
called ‘disorder’. These evolved to the domains shown in
Figure 2. Whatever the names, the intent is clear: the domains on
the right are ordered, where cause and effect are known or can be
discovered. Those on the left are unordered, and cause and effect
can be deduced only with hindsight or not at all, which would
apply to megaprojects.
Both the goals-and-methods matrix and the Cyneﬁn framework
indicate that conventional tools, methods and approaches will not
help in managing complex projects through their life cycle and
may in fact impede their management. [ University of Leeds] on [12/07/18]. Published with permission by the ICE undA way of visualising complexity in projects was developed by
Williams et al. (1995) and modiﬁed by Jobling for this paper
based on involvement in a recent project (Figure 3). The
‘management decision’ was to maintain the original completion
date because the owner did not accept that it had fundamentally
changed the project. The contractor’s attempts to maintain the
original completion date were unsuccessful and further disrupted
its works, compounded all the delays and hence compounded the
contractor’s costs and losses. The decision is typical of many
owners who can ill afford delays to their projects.
Williams (1999) emphasised the need for new methods of
analysis and management to deal with increased complexity,
noting that traditional models, such as conventional critical-path
network schedules, cannot deal with goal or method uncertainty,
but apart from a very brief note of the use of contractual
mechanisms such as alliancing, there is no further mention of
contracts or contractual arrangements.
4. Performance of megaprojects
Megaprojects are not new. Sykes (1986) observed that
megaprojects, more often than not, are characterised by failure
and the majority of the largest and most difﬁcult fail to be
launched. Over half of those that are launched subsequently fail.
Sykes (1986) noted that the exact point of change from traditional
to megaproject cannot be precisely deﬁned; nevertheless the
quantitative change has brought about an often unrecognised
qualitative change. Hence experience on conventional projects
and with conventional contracts has to be applied with caution as
it can be misleading.
Megaprojects should be considered as providing additional
challenges that cannot be resolved with traditional and operative
project management and contractual tools. Flyvbjerg et al.
(2003a, 2003b) observed that despite all claims of improvement,
forecasting success in megaproject delivery has not improved
in 70 years. Dimitriou et al. (2012) emphasised the quality
of megaprojects as an open system and agent of change forType 2 project
Product
development
Type 4 project
Research and
organisational change
Type 1 project
Engineering and
construction
Type 3 project
Applications software
development
No
Yes
Yes No
Methods
well
defined
Goals well defined
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Figure 2. Cyneﬁn domains19
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(cost, time and quality) that considers projects as closed systems.
The facts are that the performance of megaprojects is very poor.
Merrow (2011) showed from a sample of over 300 industrial
megaprojects that around two-thirds overran their costs and schedule
by over 25% with execution times over 50% higher than forecast
and suffered severe operational problems into their second year after
start-up (for oil and gas megaprojects, this was nearer 75% of the
time). Merrow (2011) also commented on the contracting approach
used (engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) lump sum
53%, engineering, procurement and construction management
(EPCm) cost reimbursable 25%, alliances 12% and mixed 10% of
the sample), noting that after suitable adjustments were made, the
lump sum and reimbursable contracts had similar rates of success/
failure but alliances were signiﬁcantly worse. His study did not
identify the precise form(s) of contract used.
It is the case that some projects are unlikely to fulﬁl their business
case, and there should be more recognition that some projects
are simply not viable. The term ‘optimism bias’ became widely
recognised in the project world following the publication of
Flyvbjerg et al.’s book (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). Recognition that
estimates were frequently too low predates this publication – for
example, Kharbanda and Stallworthy (1983), UMIST PMG
(1989) and the unpublished 1986 report by Thompson PA, Perry
JG, Nicholson T and Jobling PE, Cost Estimating Study for20
ed by [ University of Leeds] on [12/07/18]. Published with permission by the ICOverseas Development Projects – but acceptance that a large
contingency sum was required to be added to early estimates took
a number of years, and Flyvbjerg et al.’s book (Flyvbjerg et al.,
2003a) is credited with being a trigger for that wider recognition.
While the optimism bias approach is a positive step forward in
mitigating time and/or cost failures in megaprojects, it is not a
panacea. Optimism uplifts require a base from which to adjust
the forecasting, as Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) noted. As megaprojects
have long durations and high levels of uncertainty, it is difﬁcult
to establish the appropriate foundation for the uplift. Equally
important is the evidence that around one-third of megaprojects
do perform satisfactorily and do not require uplifts, the difﬁculty
being the inability to identify the appropriate third. The potential
for a more holistic solution therefore needs to be investigated. A
fundamental question is how much the theoretical transfer of risk
to the supply chain may inﬂuence both the base estimate and the
uplift, in other words the viability of the project.
5. The role of contracts
Based on the authors’ experience, less ﬂexible forms of contract
such as the International Federation of Consulting Engineers
(Fidic) suite of contracts as set out by Watermeyer (2012),
modiﬁed versions of standard forms or broadly similar but bespoke
contracts have been used and continue to be used for many
megaprojects. Recent experience suggests that these are now being
tightened up to transfer even more risk to the supply chain, whichManagement decision
Enforced work on
unfrozen items Lack of design freeze
Tight timescale
Increased rework
Approval delays Activities more
parallel
Increased
delay Increased cross-relation
between parallel activities
Increase in
activity durations
More work to do
Check and redesign
Design not fit
for purpose
Coordination of
design
Misuse of approval process
to introduce changes
Figure 3. Non-linear complexity (modiﬁed from Williams et al. (1995))E under the CC-BY license 
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Fidic ‘Silver Book’ (Fidic, 2017) model form of contract and
amendments thereof, Hosie (2007) suggested that owners wish for
greater transfer of risk to contractors than is actually achieved.
Hosie (2007) also suggested that tight monitoring and control
will provide owners with some assurance that projects will be
completed within time, cost and performance targets. As evidenced
earlier, this assurance is frequently not achieved for megaprojects.
Recent changes in the Fidic suite of contracts reported by
Glover (2017) aim to improve the outcomes of projects, but
the changes do not deal with the fundamental problem of
increasing complexity. The comments received from contractors’
associations indicate their concerns that the proposed changes will
simply add to bureaucracy through focusing on disputes rather
than seeking to improve the management and delivery processes.
Valentin and Vorster (2012: p. 25) noted the following.
It has been established that it is highly likely that a relationship exists
between the probability of contract failure and the type of contract
signed by the contracting parties. Although FIDIC and NEC-type
model conditions of contract (as well as numerous hybrids) are
commonly used, a number of types of contract and sector-speciﬁc
conditions of contract exist. There is no doubt that conditions of
contract documents can be ranked in order of promoting failure.
Unfortunately, no reliable data currently exists to do so due to the fact
that groups of projects fail rather than individual projects and it is thus
not possible to isolate and quantify the relativity of failure in a
meaningful way.
Increasingly in the UK and in countries inﬂuenced by UK
practice, public sector megaprojects such as the 2012 Olympics
programme and Crossrail are using the New Engineering Contract
(NEC) suite of contracts, with emphasis on the target cost option,
a trend started by the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (High Speed 1).
Their circumstances as publicly funded major infrastructure
projects in one of the world’s richest nations are substantially
different from the private sector commercial and industrial
projects, particularly in less developed and poorer countries. Any
conclusions about the contribution to their outcomes made by the
form of contract that they used could therefore be misleading.
First, these projects have beneﬁtted from improvements in
stakeholder management, improved risk management and other
approaches that have emerged in parallel with the adoption of
the NEC. For example, Morgan (2011) commented on Crossrail’s
success and how risk management had contributed to it.
Second, their public funding allows for signiﬁcant provision of
contingency sums that may not be feasible for most projects in the
commercial private sector or in less wealthy nations.
In a recent paper, Uff (2017) was highly critical of the claims
made for the beneﬁts of using the NEC contracts. Like Valentin [ University of Leeds] on [12/07/18]. Published with permission by the ICE undand Vorster (2012), Uff (2017) noted the difﬁculties in carrying
out systematic analyses of the outcomes of contracts, including
the extreme variability in circumstances in which contracts are
drawn up and used, as well as issues of conﬁdentiality and the
simple practicality of gaining access to the necessary data.
6. Best practice: a constraint?
In recent years, the concept of ‘best practice’ has become
commonplace in industry guidelines, government advice,
accreditation schemes and so on. The reasons for this are obvious,
but there is a risk that such practices become deeply embedded in
the approaches of contractors and the owners and their advisors.
From being new approaches at their inception, they move through
a cycle developed by Jobling and illustrated in Figure 4.
The cycle starts with their initial identiﬁcation, followed by usage
by a few major users and then more general acceptance as
they become more widely used, shared and recommended to the
point at which they become recognised as best practice. However,
as suggested by the goals-and-methods matrix and the Cyneﬁn
framework and as has been observed in practice for megaprojects,
there are limits to the applicability of any particular tool, technique
or approach. What is perceived as best practice or good industry
practice may be applicable only in certain circumstances. Complex
megaprojects are now recognised as being applications where
traditional approaches, tools and techniques have signiﬁcant
shortcomings and may be at best unsuitable, or at worst
counterproductive. Nevertheless, shortcomings notwithstanding, they
are often speciﬁed in the contract documents used for megaproject
execution.
The reasons for the difﬁculty in scaling from traditional forms of
contract can be summarised under three broad headings
■ risks and uncertainty
■ increased complexity leading to increasing
unpredictability
■ general uncertainty in the world economy, decreased
commodity prices and increased competitionFew major
users
General
acceptance
New approach Shortcomings
recognised
High
Acceptance
HighLow
Low
Understanding
Best practice
Figure 4. Best practice: the acceptance-against-applicability matrix21
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■ larger projects mean multiple stakeholders and consortia
or joint ventures for both owners and contractors
■ increasing multiplicity of potential suppliers in low-cost
developing countries
■ reduced programme duration and reduced budgets■ constraints
■ emerging complexity (best practices are no longer
applicable)
■ resistance to adopting appropriate techniques for legal and
cultural reasons.
7. Incomplete contract: dilemma or
constraint?
Lyons and Mehta (1997) suggested that classical contract theory
assumes that for any situation, a complete contract can be drafted.
This would include the capability to mitigate adverse effects
while specifying everything in detail. Gaski (1984) observed that
this apparent level of detail, while effective in some cases, can
cause disputes. In practice, the time and cost implications of
trying to deﬁne completely a long-duration contract mean that
most contracts are in fact ‘incomplete’. Chen (2000) deﬁned an
incomplete contract as an agreement that goes beyond what is
veriﬁable. Incomplete contracts still have duties and controls but
recognise that it is just not possible to anticipate every future
incident and contingency.
Emphasis is often placed on ‘getting the contract right’ to include
everything. To try to satisfy this need, the production of formal
contracts containing highly regulated provisions for the conduct
and behaviour of the parties is frequently developed at signiﬁcant
expense, but such contracts will still be incomplete, and possibly
counterproductive, as suggested by Zheng et al. (2008).
Following from the discussion of complexity, it would appear
inevitable that no complete contract can be drafted for contracts that
are complex. An added difﬁculty is that projects that may appear
to be simple and straightforward could have characteristics of
complex projects and become increasingly difﬁcult to deliver using
conventional tools, techniques and approaches to contracting, even
when some of these are considered to be best practice – for
example, projects for which the schedule is compressed compared
to previous norms for similar projects.
A formal contract is well understood in the context of a traditional
contract but is expensive and often ineffective over the life cycle
of a megaproject; indeed, it may even cause conﬂicts and prevent
ﬂexible and adaptive actions from being executed. In contrast,
incomplete contracts that recognise that they contain uncertainty
will require collaborative processes between contract parties to
be realised which are beyond the familiar comfort zone of
well-known contract practice.22
ed by [ University of Leeds] on [12/07/18]. Published with permission by the IC8. Discussion of issues
The earlier sections of the paper have demonstrated that there
appears to be a signiﬁcant gap in understanding of the role and
impacts on the performance and delivery of megaprojects of the full
suite of documents forming the contract(s) between the parties.
Owners who wish to transfer risk to their contractors and the
supply chain often believe that this can be achieved by tightening
up contract terms and increasing the amount of details in the
contract documents despite little evidence to support this view.
There is a lack of recognition that megaprojects require incomplete
contracts due to their inherent complexity and uncertainty.
There appears therefore to be a widening gap between the shortfalls
in the delivery of megaprojects and the perceptions of researchers
exploring complexity or offering incremental solutions to project
management performances that are successful in traditional projects
but have not been so successful for megaprojects. Indeed, the
failure to meet objectives may result in the development of
techniques and tools that are not used due to contractual and legal
constraints or that are not matched to the increased complexity of
megaprojects. Despite performance shortfalls and increasing
recognition of complexity, the requirement to keep within existing
legal constraints means that the advice that owners obtain from
their legal advisors will always tend to err on the side of caution,
even when projects are moving away from the easily deﬁned, linear
and relatively straightforward delivery models of the past.
9. Constraints imposed by contracts
The preference of many owners is still for complete contracts,
often with risks weighted heavily against the contractors and the
supply chain. In theory, the risk can be priced so long as it is
recognised and understood, but this is a naive approach by the
standards of recent thinking on the management of megaprojects.
There are several reasons for this.
■ The extent of uncertainty makes tenders impossible either to
plan or to price with any degree of certainty, meaning that
contractors pricing for increasingly complex projects cannot
be conﬁdent in the bid price or schedule, nor, of course, can
the owners be.
■ Unrealistically short durations for contractors to implement
projects are unlikely to be achievable.
■ Even if the tender is priced logically and completely taking
risk allocation into account, competitive tendering means that
bidders that have omitted or incorrectly assessed risk will
have a price advantage. Any margins are likely to be further
eroded as ﬁnal negotiations are concluded against the
backdrop of highly completive world markets.
From the perspective of contractors, owner delays and changes
are unlikely to be fully compensated because owners are likely to
invoke strict compliance with contracts’ provisions for notifying
and fully particularising claims. Contractors’ failures to comply
with contract provisions will be treated as legitimate reasons for
rejecting claims for compensation, particularly for delay and theE under the CC-BY license 
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be small and even incremental, the burden on contractors of
identifying, notifying and quantifying impacts is substantial, and
the result is unlikely to satisfy the strict legal standards of proof.
Frequently, neither party wins: the project is late and over budget,
but the contractor’s margins have also been eroded or removed.
None of this is unknown. Experience suggests, however, that owners
and their legal advisors place too much emphasis on trying to assure
timely completion, price certainty and performance by transferring
more risks to the supply chain. This can be counterproductive,
particularly as far as timely completion is concerned. Delays,
consequential increases in cost and lost revenues adversely impact
individual projects, businesses, the health of the construction
industry and possibly whole national economies (Flyvbjerg, 2014).
Strict allocation and ‘management’ of risks per the contract does
little to encourage pragmatic, and usually more realistic, approaches
to risk management. So-called risk events are rarely discrete events
but more likely the consequence of multiple actions, inactions or
external circumstances that are not conﬁned to one or other of the
parties to the contract. For example, Atkinson et al. (2006) stated
that uncertainty in a variety of forms requiring management
attention goes well beyond a set of possible events that might
impair project performance. Similarly, if opportunities to improve
the likelihood of the megaproject being successful are to be taken
advantage of, more rather than less co-operation is likely to be
required. Contract forms such as the NEC have been developed to
address these concerns but have had little use outside the UK,
public sector practice or countries inﬂuenced by UK practice, and
as referenced earlier, there are concerns about their effectiveness.
Other speciﬁc areas constrained by contract forms include planning/
scheduling. In order to ensure that contractors’ schedules comply with
the generally recognised best practice, in the authors’ experience, it
has become common for contracts to specify in considerable detail
the owner’s requirements for scheduling down to explicit
requirements for methods, levels of schedule detail and even the
proprietary software to be used. This has the perceived beneﬁt of, in
theory at least, a suitable basis for the owner to assess properly if
requests by contractors for extensions of time are realistic and
demonstrable by accepted industry standards such as the Society of
Construction Law’s Delay and Disruption Protocol (SCL, 2017).
While this approach appears reasonable, the requirement to
develop detailed schedules and programmes within the timescales
available given the size and durations of megaprojects is
unrealistic. Contractors cannot quickly develop sufﬁcient reliable
information to allow the development of fully detailed and
resourced critical-path networks for submission to the owner for
review and approval within a few weeks of contract start.
Theoretically, contractors could employ more resources to prepare
programmes, but this has practical limitations such as obtaining
and assimilating all the data and then assembling detailed [ University of Leeds] on [12/07/18]. Published with permission by the ICE undschedules within a short period for megaprojects with multiple
stakeholders, sometimes of different nationalities and capabilities;
the key but almost wholly unrealistic assumption being that the
baseline schedule will not change or will be changed only in
speciﬁed ways and by speciﬁed mechanisms so that it can be used
to measure entitlement to contractual extensions of time.
Contract management procedures and contract terms create
bottlenecks due to resource constraints, particularly in owners’
organisations. The timescales set out in contracts to deal with
vast numbers of individual document and design reviews may
be unachievable within the scheduled duration. This forces
the contractor to proceed at risk. The difﬁculties of expediting
approvals may be exacerbated by the division of responsibilities
on the owners’ side, particularly in the cases of consortia or joint
ventures unless a clear governance structure is in place.
10. Basis for further work
There is clearly concern among all parties associated with
megaprojects that the delivery and performance record is not good.
This paper shows that improvements in project management and
the modiﬁcation and scaling up of traditional project contracts have
so far made little positive impression on megaproject delivery and
may encourage implementation of projects that have little chance
of success. It appears that there needs to be a greater exchange
of views between the various parties – and particularly the legal,
procurement and project management disciplines – to seek to
develop appropriate approaches. Factors militating against the
achievement of the owners’ objectives include the size and structure
of many projects, which suggests that clearer recognition of the
impact of these factors by both owners and contractors, together
with their respective advisors, would help improve the quality of
the contractual and management arrangements for projects.
A pragmatic approach would be to seek to match more closely the
approaches between the, often conﬂicting, legal and contractual
requirements and the most appropriate tools and techniques. Some
relaxation of the speciﬁcations for, say, schedule and project
controls tools could encourage the use of more ﬂexible and more
appropriate approaches. At present, however, there seems little
hunger for what may be regarded as a more realistic approach to
the management and contracting for megaprojects.
The main lesson from this paper that is suggested by the authors
is that there is a case for new research to be focused on the
relationship between contracts and the delivery of megaprojects. The
incomplete nature of megaprojects must be taken into consideration.
Certain risks are inherent speciﬁcally to megaprojects, and this must
be recognised in forming any new approach. While not a panacea, it
is clear that replacing the unsuccessful scaling up of traditional
contract methods has the potential to improve megaproject delivery
and avoid or reduce certain constraints. The view that transferring
risk to the contractors will result in more certainty in achieving
owners’ objectives and may therefore lead to the implementation of
projects that have no chance of success merits investigation.23
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to help guide future research into the role of contracts in megaproject
management and delivery.REFERENCES
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